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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Randle argued that the district court erred when it 
applied the feel free to leave inquiry instead of the feel free to ignore the officer's 
request when it determined that Mr. Randle was not seized within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. Additionally, Mr. Randle argued that he was seized under the feel 
free to leave inquiry and that his potential criminal liability for obstructing should have 
been considered as a factor under both of the aforementioned tests. In its 
Respondent's Brief the State argued that the district court did not err when it denied 
Mr. Randie's motion to suppress. In support of this contention, the State relied on an 
unpublished opinion and on an analogy to the "knock and talk" doctrine. 
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the precedential value of an 
unpublished opinion and the State's assertion that "knock and talk" encounters do not 
have to be supported by any reasonable suspicion. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Randie's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court err when it applied the feel free to leave inquiry as opposed 
to the feel free to ignore the officer's request inquiry in determining whether 
Mr. Randle was seized within the meaning of the State and Federal 
Constitutions? 
2. Did the district court err in its application of the feel free to leave inquiry when it 
found that Mr. Randle was not seized within the meaning of the State and 
Federal Constitutions? 
3. Should Mr. Randie's potential criminal liability for obstructing pursuant to 
I.C. § 18-705 have been considered as a factor under both the feel free to leave 
inquiry and the feel free to ignore the officer's request inquiry?1 
1 For purposes of t~1is Reply Brief, argument will only be presented on issue II. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Its Application Of The Feel Free To Leave Inquiry When It 
Found That Mr. Randle Was Not Seized Within The Meaning Of The State And Federal 
Constitutions 
A. Introduction 
The State relied on an unpublished opinion as precedent in contravention of the 
Idaho Supreme Court Operating Rules. 
Additionally, the State argued that a consensual encounter with police is 
analogous with the 'knock and talk" doctrine and does not need to be supported by 
reasonable suspicion. However, the State's authority for this proposition requires that 
the State have a governmental interest to investigate or reasonable suspicion. 
B. The District Court Erred In Its Application Of The Free Feel To Leave Inquiry 
When It Found That Mr. Randle Was Not Seized Within The Meaning Of The 
State And Federal Constitutions 
In its Respondent's Brief the State relies on an unpublished opinion, State v. 
James, Unpublished Opinion No 624 (September 2, 2010), to support of its position that 
Mr. Randle was not seized when the officer knocked on his window. However, the 
unpublished opinion is not to be cited as authority and is, therefore, neither case law nor 
binding precedent. (Respondent's Brief, p.9) (see also Supreme Court Operating Rules 
Rule 15(f) "If an opinion is not published, it may not be cited as authority or precedent in 
any court.") (emphasis added). 
Additionally, the James opinion should be considered as a community caretaker 
case, which is not applicable in this case because the district court expressly found that 
that exception to the warrant equipment was not applicable under the facts of this case. 
(05/03/10 Tr., p.14, Ls.11-14.) In James, a police officer had noticed a truck at a gas 
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station with the engine running and the driver slumped forward. James at 1. Two and 
one-half hours later, the same officer noticed the same vehicle and the driver were in 
the same position. Id. 
The officer parked behind the truck without turning on his overhead lights, 
approached the driver's window, and asked James to roll down his 
window. After James's [sic] failed attempts to roll down the window, the 
officer opened the driver's side door and James stepped out of the truck. 
The officer noticed that James smelled of alcohol, his eyes were red and 
bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. 
Id. at 1-2. James was arrested for DUI and challenged the arrest based on a theory that 
the officer's actions constituted an illegal seizure. Id. at 2. In analyzing James' 
argument, the Idaho Court of Appeals citied to In re Clayton, 113 Idaho 817 (1998). Id. 
at 3-4. In Clayton, law enforcement noticed a person slumped over the steering wheel 
of a running vehicle with the lights on early in the morning. Clayton, 113 Idaho at 817-
18. The officer approached the vehicle "to determine whether the person was in need 
of medical attention, asleep or intoxicated." Id. at 818. Upon his approach of the 
vehicle, the officer "opened the driver's side door, reached in, turned the motor off, and 
took possession of the keys." Id. Mr. Clayton challenged the officer's actions as an 
illegal search. Id. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the officer's actions under the 
community caretaker function. Id. Specifically, the Court stated: 
When [the officer] observed the vehicle with its motor running, lights on, and the 
driver slumped forward, he had a duty as a police officer to investigate, as stated 
in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 443,442 (1973): 
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and also 
because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled or 
involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen 
contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than police-
citizen contact in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because 
the officer may believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but 
many more will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal 
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officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim 
of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be 
described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the 
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation 
of a criminal statute. 
Here, at 1 :30 in the morning, the vehicle was in a parking lot with its lights on and 
motor running, with the driver slumped forward. Tested upon practical 
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act, this situation 
falls outside the boundaries of normal conduct. The driver could have been hurt 
or sick, and in need of medical attention. Officer Moser acted prudently and 
satisfied his caretaking function when investigating the vehicle. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Clayton decision is a community caretaker case. 
In James it is not entirely clear whether the opinion is a community caretaker 
case or if it stands for a larger proposition. The State cites the following portion of the 
James case: 
We agree with the district court that the officer's actions did not amount to 
a seizure. When the officer pulled into the parking lot, he parked well 
behind James's [sic] truck and did not activate his overhead lights. James 
was already parked when the officer arrived and he was under no 
obligation to comply with the officer's request to roll down the window. He 
was never given any order or direction to exit the vehicle; he did so on his 
own accord. The actions of the officer did not amount to a seizure as the 
officer made no show of force or authority over James that restricted his 
freedom of movement. 
(Respondent's Brief, p.9) (quoting James, at 5). However, the full paragraph 
begins with the following three sentences: 
The district court determined that the officer's actions did not amount to a 
stop or a detention. The district court denied James's [sic] motion to 
suppress stating that the opening of the driver's door was 'a necessary 
and prudent act of that officer's duties to protect the public. And that it 
was a reasonable act of a community caretaking function that did not 
violate James's [sic] Forth Amendment rights.' We will not disturb the 
district court's findings of fact which are supported by substantial 
evidence. We agree with the district court that the .... 
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Id. Since the community caretaker doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement 
and its invocation must be based on the assumption that either a search or a seizure 
occurred. State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 304 (Ct. App. 2006). ("One narrow exception 
to the warrant requirement permits an officer to search a vehicle in furtherance of 
community caretaking activities.") (see also State v. Maddox, 137 Idaho 821, 824-25 
(Ct. App. 2002). ("One narrow exception to the warrant requirement permits an officer to 
search a vehicle in furtherance of community caretaking activities. Since the district 
court applied the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement, there must 
have been either an illegal seizure or search. Therefore, the James opinion should be 
considered as a community care taker case. 
In its Respondent's Brief the State argues that the officer's knock on Mr. Randie's 
window was a consensual encounter, 
analogous to a 'knock and talk' police investigatory practice, which has 
clearly been recognized as legitimate. See U.S. v. Gould, 364 F.3d 578, 
590 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing U.S. v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716 720 (5th Cir. 
2001)). An Officer need not first develop reasonable suspicion that 
criminal activity is afoot before employing this strategy. Gould, 364 F.3d 
at 590, Jones, 239 F.3d 720; see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 
435 (1991). 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 10-11.) The State's authority does not stand for this 
proposition and is only applicable when law enforcement officers are carrying out an 
official investigation. 
In Gould, law enforcement had received "a telephone warning that Gould, known 
to be a convicted felon with a reputation for violence, was planning to kill two local 
judges." Gould, 364 F.3d at 580. Police officer went to the known residence of 
Mr. Gould and entered the home with the consent of a roommate and preformed a 
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protective sweep of the residence. Id. The focus of the Gould opinion was resolving the 
issue of whether a protective sweep must accompany a search incident to a lawful 
arrest. Id, at 381. While addressing an argument related to that inquiry the court noted: 
We note that a 'knock and talk' police investigatory practice has clearly 
been recognized as legitimate. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 239 F.3d 
716, 720 (5th Cir.2001 ). Certainly, the officers were in the mobile home for 
a legitimate governmental purpose, namely questioning Gould about the 
information they had received earlier that day, in two telephone calls from 
Gould's employee (or co-worker) Forehand, an individual otherwise 
unknown to them, that Gould, known to be a person prone to violence, 
was planning to kill two local judges. As the district court recognized, 'the 
officers had a legitimate governmental interest in questioning the 
defendant about the information they had received.' 
Id. at 590 (emphasis added). The" knock and talk" practice is an investigatory practice. 
Inherent in that statement is that law enforcement must be carrying out an investigation. 
Tl"lis is distinguishable between a consensual government contact where a policy officer 
is have a casual and consensual conversation with a citizen. This interpretation is 
supported by the fact that the 5th Circuit mentioned that law enforcement were carrying 
out the policed investigation for a legitimate governmental purpose, i.e. a purported 
death threat against two local judges. (empl1asis added.) 
In U.S. v. Jones, 239 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 2001), which is cited to in both the 
Respondent's Brief and in Gould, law enforcement had received various complaints 
about an apartment and the sale of illegal drugs. Law enforcement decided to 
investigate tl1ese complaints, and on their way to the apartment, were the alleged drug 
sales were occurring, they had a conversation with a woman who claimed that she had 
gone to the apartment to buy illegal drugs. Jones, 239 at 718-19. When the officer 
reached the exterior of the apartment they noticed a hand gun in plain view inside the 
apartment. Id. at 719. Mr. Jones was arrested and in a motion to suppress he argued 
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that the officer's entry into his apartment was unreasonable because the officer's 
created the exigency used to justify their warrantless entry into the apartment. Id. at 
719-720. In ruling on this issue, the 5th Circuit reasoned as follows: 
In assessing whether the officers created the exigency, we focus on the 
"reasonableness of the officers' investigative tactics leading up to the 
warrantless entry." Blount, 123 F.3d at 838. 
Federal courts have recognized the "knock and talk" strategy as a 
reasonable investigative tool when officers seek to gain an occupant's 
consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect criminal activity. 
See United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir.) ("Reasonable 
suspicion cannot justify the warrantless search of a house, but it can 
justify the agents' approaching the house to question the occupants.'°)i 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907, 112 S.Ct. 299, 116 L.Ed.2d 243 (1991); United 
States v. Hardeman, 36 F.Supp.2d 770, 777 (E.D.Mich.1999) (discussing 
the "knock and talk" procedure to obtain a suspects consent to search). 
Officer Ruff testified that his purpose in approaching Apartment No. 3 was 
to identify the occupants and discuss the complaints of drug activity. This 
investigative tactic is not inherently unreasonable. 
Id. at 720. According to the State's authority, the talk and knock rule applies in two 
contexts, when officers seek consent to search or when officers reasonably suspect 
criminal activity. Contrary to the state's assertion that "[a]n Officer need not first 
develop reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot before employing this [knock 
and talk] strategy," it is apparent that reasonable suspicion is required under the latter of 
the two contexts. (Respondent's Brief, p. 11.) The remaining question is what judicial 
scrutiny is applied when officers are employing the "knock and talk" doctrine to obtain 
consent to search. 
State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656 (Ct. App. 2002), dealt with a routine traffic stop, 
which eventually lead to an arrest. In upholding the arrest, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
noted that a request for consent to search was a subcomponent of an investigation. 
Johnson, 137 Idaho at 660. "This reasonable suspicion justified further investigation, 
8 
including the request for consent to search Johnson's automobile." Id. Implicit in the 
foregoing is that law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion to legally request 
consent to search. 
The "knock and talk" rule is not applicable in this matter because Mr. Randle was 
not the subject of a police investigation when the officer knocked on his window. In fact, 
and as pointed out in the Appellant's brief, the officer admitted that he had no legitimate 
reason to speak with Mr. Randle. (Appellant's Brief, pp.1-2) (see also 05103/10 
Tr., p.14, Ls.11-14) ("I don't think that the State would be arguing the community 
caretaker function in this case, because I don't know the articulated facts would support 
that"). 
In sum, the State's reliance on an unpublished onion is misplaced because it 
cannot stand for precedential authority. Further, the "knock and talk" rule is a tactic law 
enforcement can employ when conducting an investigation which is supported by some 
form of governmental interest such as reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is 
afoot. Since there was no investigation and no reasonable suspicion in this case, the 
"knock and talk" doctrine is not applicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Randle respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order 
denying Mr. Randie's motion to suppress and remand this case to the district court for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 19th day of September, 2011. 
,,/---z_ 6 
/ SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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